Regional Integration in West Africa - Are Countries Diverging? by Inganäs, Jacob
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Integration in West Africa 
Are Countries Diverging? 
 
 
 
Jacob Inganäs 
jacob.inganas@gmail.com 
Bachelor Essay, NEKH01, 15 ECTS Credits 
Lund University, Department of Economics 
Tutor: Yves Bourdet 
23
rd
 January 2014 
 
  
Abstract 
The author examines reasons for divergence of GDP per capita among the 
members of ECOWAS, a RIA in West Africa of 15 members. Also, WAEMU, 
another RIA in West Africa, is analyzed although to a smaller extent than 
ECOWAS. Mainly consequences of trade diversion and agglomeration effects are 
considered. An analysis of the dispersion of GDP per capita between the members 
is carried out to find evidence for the predicted divergence among the members. 
The author concludes that there are reasons to believe that regional integration in 
West Africa is causing divergence of GDP per capita. However, since intra-
community trade constitutes only a minor share of total trade of the members of 
ECOWAS, it is difficult to assess the effects of regional integration.   
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Abbreviations 
AU  African Union 
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1 Introduction1 
1.1 Overview 
There are many economic reasons why countries choose to integrate. One of the 
main is that the resulting trade creation is believed to increase the welfare of the 
participating countries. Many times economic integration has indeed led to 
increased welfare. However, it is important to remember that different members 
of an integration agreement might not benefit equally from it; this leads to the 
question if countries within an integration agreement are converging or diverging 
as a result of it.  
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an 
agreement between 15 countries of West Africa. Officially, the integration process 
started in 1975 and it is still going on. Further steps of integration are planned; 
most importantly, a common external tariff (CET) and a common currency. 
However, economic integration and the implementation of the CET may increase 
the inequality of welfare of the members of ECOWAS. Explicitly, integration can 
lead to trade diversion which could benefit the members which possess most of 
the industrial capability of the community. On the other hand, the members which 
do not have industries to the same extent may simply lose from integration. Also, 
integration could create larger clusters of industries which might be spread 
unequally among members. 
It is difficult to predict what the consequences of further integration will be. 
However, some issues are raised in order to understand what integration has 
meant this far and what the outcome of increased integration will be. In broad, the 
paper is divided in three parts. Firstly, the process of regional integration of West 
Africa will be examined. Here, facts about the member states of ECOWAS are 
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presented as well. Secondly, the theory of economic integration is discussed and 
especially in the context of developing countries. There are two main issues that 
will be dealt with: comparative advantages and agglomeration effects. Also, the 
theory of convergence and divergence is presented. The third part of the essay 
includes an analysis based on the discussion of the theories of part two. Moreover, 
the analysis of convergence and divergence of the member states is provided here. 
According to theory, it is plausible that countries will diverge. Also, there is 
evidence of divergence of GDP per capita between the members of ECOWAS. 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
Is regional integration causing divergence of GDP per capita between member 
states of ECOWAS? If it does, why do countries diverge? 
1.1.2 Methods 
Different materials have been reviewed to study the process of economic 
integration of West Africa. Also, a literature review of theories connected to 
economic integration and convergence and divergence has been made. In order to 
study changes of internal and external comparative advantages, the measure of 
revealed comparative advantage is used. To look for agglomeration effects, the 
development over time of the value added of the manufacturing sector is 
examined. To investigate if theory is correct, convergence will be studied among 
the members of ECOWAS by measuring the dispersion of income per capita 
among the member states, normally known as analyzing sigma convergence. This 
will be done by using the standard deviation but also by weighting the standard 
deviation by population size, both will be presented in graphs. Also, previous 
research is used in order to find out whether countries are converging or diverging 
in terms of GDP per capita. 
1.1.3 Delimitations 
The essay is about regional agreements in West Africa. Focus will be on 
ECOWAS; however, the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
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(WAEMU) will be discussed as well. The reason why most of the focus is put on 
ECOWAS is that this community is the only regional integration agreement (RIA) 
in West Africa that is recognized by the African Union (AU) (UNECA, 2012, p 
xi). 
Furthermore, consequences of economic integration will be considered. Non-
economic goals will not be included in the study even though security issues, for 
instance, are widespread in West Africa and have been of concern to ECOWAS. 
However, in this paper, the consequences of conflicts and other political issues 
will not be addressed although these are still assumed to have significant impact 
on the process, results and prospects of regional integration.  
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2 Regional Integration in West Africa 
2.1 Review of the Integration Process 
Economic integration is not new to Africa. Many attempts have been made all 
over the continent; some of them have been successful while others have been less 
successful. Today, there are eight regional economic communities recognized by 
the AU. The intention of the AU is to strengthen these economic communities and 
create one continental economic union which incorporates all of Africa’s 
economies in 2028 (UNECA, 2012, p 14). 
Currently, there are mainly two regional agreements of economic integration 
in West Africa: ECOWAS and WAEMU (or UEMOA in French). ECOWAS is 
on its way to become a customs union (CU), while WAEMU already is one; 
WAEMU’s common external tariff was established in 2000. All of the eight 
members of WAEMU
2
 are also members of ECOWAS
3
; in total, ECOWAS 
consists of 15 members. The countries of the two regional agreements are 
different in many ways; for instance concerning size, GDP per capita and 
structure of trade. 
Except for ECOWAS and WAEMU there are several other agreements in the 
region such as the Mano River Union (Schiff and Winters, 2003, p 76), the 
“Conseil de l’Entente” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2014) and the Permanent 
Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS, 2013). Some of 
the members of ECOWAS are also members of these intergovernmental 
organizations; additionally, there are states outside of ECOWAS which are 
members as well. 
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In this introductory part, the process of economic integration of West Africa 
will be presented. The main focus is on the development of ECOWAS since the 
main objective of the paper is to understand what effects ECOWAS has and will 
have on the economies of the region. However, WAEMU will be examined 
shortly as well. Also, a brief description of the economies of the region follows 
subsequently. 
2.1.1 ECOWAS 
ECOWAS has existed for more than thirty years. The community was established 
by the treaty of Lagos which was signed in 1975 (ECOWAS, 1993). The treaty 
was first signed by 15 states and two years later Cape Verde joined the 
community (Ogbeidi, 2010, p 482). However, Mauritania withdrew in 1999, 
making it a community consisting of 15 members (Aryeetey, 2001, p 14). 
The main intention of ECOWAS is to “promote economic integration in all 
fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, 
energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial 
questions, [and] social and cultural matters” (ECOWAS, 2007b). It is stated in the 
treaty of ECOWAS that in order to promote economic integration, national 
policies are going to be harmonized, a common market shall be established by the 
removal of tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers between members, a CET shall be 
introduced, and, finally, there shall be free movement of persons, goods, services 
and capital among the members. Some of these measures have already been 
adopted and established, mainly the free movement of goods and people. 
Moreover, an economic union is anticipated to be finalized by having common 
economic, financial, social and cultural policies and finally by the introduction of 
a common currency among all members (ECOWAS, 1993). Today, the members 
of ECOWAS which are also members of WAEMU have a common currency (the 
CFA). The members that do not have the CFA plan to create another currency 
union with an alternative common currency, the ECO. Later, the two monetary 
unions are expected to merge. 
The top institution of the community is the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government of Member States (in short: the Authority) which is responsible for 
the general direction of ECOWAS. Under the Authority, there are several other 
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institutions. In Aryeteey’s words, the Council of Ministers “put[s] flesh on the 
directives that the Heads of state issue to the Secretariat” (2001, p 15). However, 
nowadays, the Secretariat has become the Commission. The other institutions are 
the Community Parliament, the Economic and Social Council, the Community 
Court of Justice; the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development; and 
Specialized Technical Commissions. The Authority may also establish additional 
institutions when it is considered to be needed (ECOWAS, 1993). 
Chapter VIII of the Revised Treaty is dedicated to issues regarding economic 
integration. Intra-community tariffs or other charges with equivalent effects and 
quantitative restrictions shall be removed according to the ECOWAS Trade 
Liberalization Scheme (ETLS). In accordance with article 37 of the treaty, a CET 
shall be set up on goods originating from countries outside of ECOWAS; this is 
also one of the main objectives of the community. The Authority may, whenever 
it is recommended by the Commission, increase the speed of the integration 
process concerning trade (ECOWAS, 1993). 
The decision to set up the ETLS was taken by the Authority in 1983. The 
objective of the ETLS was to achieve free trade within the community 
(ECOWAS, 1993). Specifically, it is stated that the intention of the ETLS is to 
encourage business, increase intra-regional trade and competitiveness of the 
region towards the rest of the world and increase GDP growth. Agricultural, 
artisan and unprocessed products had been subject to free trade since 1979; 
however, industrial goods were included in the free trade regime in 1990 as a 
consequence of the ETLS. In order to control which goods that come from the 
members of ECOWAS, a protocol was established in 2003 where rules of origin 
are defined. To be allowed free trade, goods shall be entirely produced within 
ECOWAS, produced by the use of material that is categorized under a different 
heading than the final product or produced of materials which have a value added 
of minimum 30 percent from producers within the community (ECOWAS). 
In 1979, in Dakar, Senegal, the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, 
Residence and Establishment was adopted by the member states. Citizens of all 
member states are since then formally allowed to live in other ECOWAS 
members to work or establish economic activities. According to the Economic 
Commission for Africa, the implementation of the Protocol on free movement of 
persons is on its way to be fully implemented (UNECA, 2012, p 17). However, 
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Aryeteey claims there are still numerous obstacles to the free movement of 
people. He also points out that most of the members of ECOWAS believe that 
immigration is problematic (Aryeetey, 2001, p 24). 
The treaty of ECOWAS was revised in 1993. The objective was to increase 
the speed of integration. In order to fasten the integration process, the application 
of decisions became supra-national; consequently, the court of justice, the 
parliament and the economic and social council were created for monitoring. 
Moreover, the community programs were extended to more areas; for instance, 
the harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies started. A community levy was 
also implemented to support the independent financing of the community. Finally, 
the cooperation in political matters increased due to the revision of the treaty 
(ECOWAS, 1993). According to Aryeetey, the revision was also meant to turn 
ECOWAS into the only regional entity of economic integration in West Africa. 
Also, one wanted to make it more democratic instead of a bureaucratic state-
driven organization (2001, p 16). 
As indicated above, the community also has the intention to set up a common 
currency. It is stated in article 55 of the revised treaty that a central bank of 
ECOWAS shall be created in order to form a monetary union (ECOWAS, 1993). 
In 2000, the Authority decided to set up the West African Monetary Institute 
(WAMI).
4
 The objectives of the WAMI are mainly the establishment of the West 
African Central Bank and the preparation of the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ); that is, the zone for the common currency – the ECO. This far, the 
macro-economic convergence of members has been difficult to achieve according 
to WAMI and the implementation of the ECO has therefore been postponed a 
number of times (WAMI, 2010). Currently, the planned year for the ECO to be 
launched is in 2015. Moreover, the monetary zones of ECOWAS and WAEMU 
are scheduled to merge in 2020 (ECOWAS, 2013b). 
In 2006, the Secretariat of ECOWAS became the Commission of ECOWAS. 
The reason was to increase the effectiveness of the community and strengthen the 
principle of supra-nationality. At the time when the Secretariat became the 
Commission a new legal regime was adopted as well. Before the change, the 
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obligations of member states were mainly covered in the conventions and the 
protocols but now so called Community Acts can be passed which facilitate 
integration (ECOWAS, 2007a). 
In 2006, an important decision was taken at the 29
th
 summit of the Authority. 
It was decided that a four band CET will be set up by the community. The four 
bands are different duty levels spanning between zero percent to 20 percent where 
zero percent apply to basic social goods, five percent to capital goods and specific 
inputs, 10 percent to intermediate goods, and 20 percent to final goods. The CET 
was at the time, and is today, already implemented among the member states of 
ECOWAS which are also members of WAEMU. A joint ECOWAS/WAEMU 
committee was established in order to manage the negotiations about which goods 
that will be put in which tariff band and about the implementation of the CET 
among all member states (Ukaoha and Ukpe, 2012, p 2). 
It was decided that the CET would come into full effect from the first of 
January 2008; still, this has not happened. The reason why it is not in place is, 
partly, because the largest member of ECOWAS in terms of GDP and population 
size, Nigeria, wanted to add an extra category. Nigeria wants to include a tariff 
band at a level of 35 percent.
5
 The intention of having a tariff band of 35 percent 
is to protect industries of particular importance for economic development 
(Ukaoha and Ukpe, 2012, p 8). It was later agreed that the CET of five categories 
shall be implemented; it has been decided to be put in place on 1
st
 January 2015 
(ECOWAS, 2013c). 
2.1.2 WAEMU 
It is difficult to study regional integration in West Africa without considering 
WAEMU. WAEMU was established as an economic and monetary union in 1994 
after the Dakar treaty had been signed by seven of its eight current members. 
Guinea-Bissau joined the community in 1997 (UEMOA). In 1999, WAEMU 
agreed to establish a CET which was realized in 2000. The establishment of the 
CET is one of five objectives mentioned in article 76 of the treaty of WAEMU 
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about the creation of a common market in the community. The other objectives 
are to remove trade barriers such as tariff and quotas between members, to have 
common rules of competition, to realize the free movement of people and capital 
and to have common technical regulations (UEMOA, 2002). 
The institutions of WAEMU are similar to those of ECOWAS. There is a 
Conference of Heads of State and Government which is responsible for the broad 
directives of the union. Secondly, the Council of Ministers is supposed to follow 
the directives of the Conference of Heads of states. Thirdly, the Commission 
represents the general interests of the union and not the interests of any 
government. It is composed of commissioners coming from the member states. 
Fourthly, there is a parliament which takes part in the decision process. Also, 
there is a Court of Justice and a Court of Audit. Moreover, there is a consultative 
organ. Lastly, the “Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique du l’Ouest” (BCEAO) 
is an independent institution of the Union in charge of the common currency, the 
CFA (UEMOA, 2002). 
The currency in use, the CFA, is also used in several other countries outside of 
WAEMU. However, the members of WAEMU have their own central bank, 
BCEAO, which issues the currency while the “Banque des Etats de l’Afrique 
Central” is the central bank for the countries which are members of the other 
community using the currency, CEMAC. The currency was established in 1945 
by France and is today guaranteed by the French treasury. Since 1999 it is pegged 
to the Euro (BCEAO, 2012). 
Thus, in some areas the members of WAEMU have integrated their economies 
more than the countries that are only members of ECOWAS. Although both of the 
communities have established free trade among the members, WAEMU is the 
only one which has become a functional CU. However, as noted, a CU with a 
CET for all ECOWAS members is projected and is planned to be realized in 2015. 
The members of WAEMU already have a common currency while the rest of the 
members of ECOWAS all have their proper currency. The ECO is planned to be 
established in 2015 among non-WAEMU members and is going to be merged 
with the CFA of WAEMU. 
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2.2 Characteristics of the Economies of West Africa 
Economic indicators from the World Development Indicators in 2012 are 
provided in table 1. Nigeria is the largest country, both in terms of GDP and 
population size. Alone it makes up 67.2 percent of the total GDP of the 
community. Nigeria along with the second and third largest economies of the 
community, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, make up 81.4 percent of the total GDP of 
the community. In total, 318.5 million people live in ECOWAS. Nigeria’s share is 
53 percent and together with Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire these three countries 
amount to 67.2 percent of the total population. The three smallest countries are 
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, all having less than two million 
inhabitants, Cape Verde has less than a half million inhabitants. Thus, the size, 
both in terms of GDP and of population size, of Nigeria and Ghana is one 
important reason why ECOWAS is considered the most central regional 
integration agreement for the AU; neither Nigeria, nor Ghana are members of 
WAEMU. 
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Table 1: Various Indicators 2012 
Country GDP
1
, 
share of 
ECOWAS 
(%) 
GDP
1
 Pop, share 
of 
ECOWAS 
(%) 
Population GDP
1
/capita  GDP
2
/capita, 
PPP 
<Average  
GDP
2
/capita, 
PPP 
Weighted 
Average 
GDP
2
/capita, 
PPP 
Poverty Headcount
3 
(%) 
Benin 2.2 5 707 932 120.8 3.2 10 050 702 567.9 1 429.5 N   33.3 
Burkina Faso 3.1 8 147 597 249.1 5.2 16 460 141 495.0 1 149.6 Y   46.7 
Cape Verde 0.6 1 476 615 062.5 0.2 494 401 2 986.7 3 615.8 N   26.6 
Côte d'Ivoire 7.2 19 004 181 835.3 6.2 19 839 750 957.9 1 580.1 N   42.7 
ECOWAS 100.0 264 193 785 830.2 100.0 318 500 013 707.2 1 410.7 N 1 775.7   
Gambia, The 0.3 795 710 666.2 0.6 1 791 225 444.2 1 597.3 N   48.4 
Ghana 7.0 18 374 187 876.3 8.0 25 366 462 724.3 1 652.3 N   28.5 
Guinea 1.3 3 529 248 118.2 3.6 11 451 273 308.2 992.8 Y   55.2 
Guinea Bissau 0.3 704 318 242.1 0.5 1 663 558 423.4 1 121.9 Y   69.3 
Liberia 0.4 1 164 691 332.6 1.3 4 190 435 277.9 516.8 Y   63.8 
Mali 2.7 7 076 905 333.4 4.7 14 853 572 476.4 963.5 Y   43.6 
Niger 1.6 4 224 609 341.6 5.4 17 157 042 246.2 642.1 Y   59.5 
Nigeria 67.2 177 670 009 383.1 53.0 168 833 776 1 052.3 2 236.8 N   46 
Senegal 4.2 10 972 446 158.5 4.3 13 726 021 799.4 1 737.1 N   46.7 
Sierra Leone 1.0 2 603 171 446.5 1.9 5 978 727 435.4 998.4 Y   52.9 
Togo 1.0 2 742 161 664.0 2.1 6 642 928 412.8 926.6 Y   58.7 
                    
Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 
1: Constant 2005 US$. 
2: Constant 2005 International $, PPP, data from 2011 for all countries.   
3: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line. Data are from various years during the period 2006-2012. 
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3 Theory 
Why do countries integrate their markets with other countries? Schiff and Winters 
identify several reasons why states enter regional agreements. Firstly, the 
increased understanding that openness to trade will contribute to development is 
one major reason. Secondly, globalization puts pressure on countries to seek 
larger markets. Thirdly, countries have the will to help neighboring countries for 
altruistic reasons. Fourthly, countries need to integrate their economies with other 
countries just because there are many other regional or preferential agreements 
around the world, to not be in one is too costly (2003, p 6-9). These are just few of 
the reasons why countries integrate. Moreover, states may seek regional 
agreements for political or security reasons as well. 
In general, one can say that the ultimate objective of economic integration is 
to increase economic welfare through trade and economic growth. There are at 
least four factors that will affect welfare: the quantity of goods produced after and 
before integration, the discrimination of goods from outside the regional 
agreement, the distribution of income between different member states of a 
community and how income is distributed within different countries (Balassa, 
1961, p 11). Increased welfare for one can mean decreased welfare for another. In 
fact, all of these factors will be indirectly considered in this text except for the last 
one, how income is distributed within countries. They are central to convergence 
and divergence. 
Generally, one denotes five stages of economic integration: free trade area 
(FTA), customs union (CU), common market, economic union and total economic 
integration. However, agreements do not always follow these specific steps 
chronologically. Below, some consequences of economic integration will be 
discussed. 
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3.1 Consequences of Economic Integration 
One main issue of economic integration, and specifically the implementation of a 
common external tariff, is to figure out whether trade creation or trade diversion 
follows as a consequence. These concepts originate from Jacob Viner (1950, p 
44). Trade creation and trade diversion concern the change of the direction of 
trade as a result of the creation of an economic integration agreement. Trade 
creation allows consumers to buy goods that are more efficiently produced than 
they were at the time before economic integration and thus increases welfare. 
Trade diversion is the opposite of trade creation; consumers will, after integration 
has occurred, “be forced” to buy products that have been produced in an 
inefficient manner compared to the products they consumed before integration. 
The reason is that the goods that are produced efficiently are after integration 
more expensive due to trade barriers, such as tariffs. Trade diversion decreases 
welfare for some but increases welfare for others. 
If one assumes that three countries produce the same commodity and sell it at 
different price levels, the situation could look like the one in diagram 1. Home is a 
small country and an importer of the commodity but has imposed ad valorem 
tariffs on imports from country A and country B. The price lines (PA and PB) of 
country A and B are indicated along with their levels when tariffs are imposed 
(PA+t and PB+t). Initially, Home chooses to import its excess demand from country 
B since country B’s goods are produced more efficiently and thus its goods are 
cheaper. 
Assume then that Home has the alternative to enter a FTA with one of the two 
other countries. If Home would enter a FTA with country B, trade creation would 
follow. The reason is that consumers turn to more goods that are produced in 
country B, away from domestic goods. Its domestic production would decrease 
from Q3 to Q1 but consumption would increase from Q4 to Q6. On the other hand, 
if Home would enter a FTA with country A, trade diversion would be the 
consequence.
6
 Now, all of Home’s imports come from Country A; however, these 
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 There is still some trade creation since Home’s production is less efficient than country A’s. However, the trade 
creation effect is smaller compared to the case of the creation of a FTA with B. 
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goods are produced less efficiently than those of country B. Consumers in Home 
would then consume at Q5. In the case of a FTA with country B the net welfare 
gain would be the sum of areas b, d, f and h. In the case of a FTA with A the 
welfare gain would be the sum of areas b and d but a loss of the government 
revenue represented by area g since the border price increases. 
 
 
 
If Home creates a FTA with country A it can still choose to have a low tariff 
on imports from B, making it possible to avoid trade diversion. Instead, if Home 
would enter a CU with A, it would not have the possibility to lower its tariff on 
imports from country B. In the latter case, trade diversion is certainly the result. 
Schiff and Winters claim that trade diversion will most likely occur when 
small developing countries integrate their economies and set up a CET. When 
small developing countries integrate their markets, there is most likely still a need 
for members to import goods from outside the regional agreement. The reason is 
that developing countries will seldom be able to supply all of the imports 
demanded of other members within the regional agreement. When members still 
have to import from outside the community, the price will be equal to the world 
price plus the import tariff. Thus, there is a partial shift to consumption of goods 
that are produced within the regional agreement; however, these are produced 
inefficiently and consumers will therefore lose from integration. On the other 
hand, producers within the community will benefit from integration since they can 
P
ri
ce
 
Quantity 
Diagram 1: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
SupplyHome 
DemandHome 
PA+t 
PB+t 
PA 
PB 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Source: Author's illustration. 
a                           b                  c                      d 
      e             f             f                   g                      h            h      
 16 
 
profit from increased consumption due to protection from the tariff (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003, p 35). 
Moreover, there are pro-competitive effects coming from economic 
integration. When countries integrate their markets, the total number of firms will 
increase; this leads to increased competition. Due to increased competition only 
the most efficient firms will stay in the market and some firms will be forced to go 
out of business. However, as Schiff and Winters argue, even though this 
phenomenon has occurred elsewhere, there is not enough evidence to say that the 
pro-competitive effects have been prominent among regional agreements of 
developing countries (2003, p 14). 
There are at least two potential effects of economic integration that are 
important to consider and requires specific attention: the change of relative 
comparative advantages and agglomeration forces. Also, other dynamic effects 
will be discussed. 
3.1.1 Comparative Advantages 
Regional economic integration gives members the opportunity to utilize their 
comparative advantages. One way to describe it is that the comparative advantage 
of a country might change relatively to other members of the community when 
there is integration; namely, there are internal and external comparative 
advantages. 
According to Venables, a member of a regional agreement which has a 
comparative advantage similar to the world average will gain from integration 
while a member which has a comparative advantage which differs greatly from 
the world average will lose from integration. The reason is that the comparative 
advantages between members might change after integration has occurred. The 
member that has a comparative advantage close to the world average will be the 
supplier of the goods which previously were bought at the world market. 
However, these goods are not expected to be produced as efficiently and are thus 
more expensive; consequently, there is trade diversion. Consumers will lose and 
producers will gain from integration. Moreover, the countries which have the 
producers within their borders will most likely increase their GDP more compared 
to other countries within the RIA. Venables claims that for this reason it is likely 
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that the change of relative comparative advantages caused by economic 
integration will lead to divergence in a RIA of least developed countries (LDCs) 
(1999, p 4-12). 
3.1.2 Agglomeration Effects 
Agglomeration forces might have diverse effects on economies of a community, 
some countries benefit, others do not. Firms may benefit from a larger market, 
which is the direct effect of economic integration. Firms that can benefit from 
internal economies of scale will be able to produce a larger amount of output at a 
lower price when the market grows larger. Thus, after integration it is probable 
that smaller firms will contract and there will be some large firms concentrated in 
fewer locations than before integration (Krugman et al., 2012, p 204). 
There are centripetal powers, agglomeration forces, which will concentrate 
industries in the same location. There are several reasons why industries tend to 
go to the same location. Namely, there are knowledge spillovers to benefit from, 
the pool of qualified workers is beneficial and specific machinery is available 
where other firms of the same sector are situated. Moreover, when consumers are 
close to the suppliers, it easier and less costly to buy goods for them (Marshall, 
1920, p 271-273). The latter is denoted by Hirschman as forward and backward 
linkages between demanders (customers) and suppliers (Hirschman, 1958). 
Moreover, these reasons are normally referred to as external economies of scale. 
More specifically, according to Krugman, the reason for geographical 
clustering is the relationship between increasing returns to scale, transport costs 
and, as already mentioned, demand. A producer which can benefit from increasing 
returns to scale and provide a whole integrated market will choose to set up its 
production in one location in order to avoid paying the fixed costs of establishing 
industries in more than one location. The producer also chooses a location where 
it can supply as many customers as possible (where demand is high) in order to 
have low transport costs. However, the demand is high where other producers 
already are situated; therefore, there is a circular relationship of industrial 
clustering (Krugman, 1996, p 23). One can thus assume that industries will be 
located in large cities and from there supply the whole community. 
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Concerning economic growth, the agglomeration forces might benefit 
countries which have agglomeration poles within their borders while countries 
which do not have such poles might lose from increased integration. Firms will go 
away from countries which do not have attractive locations; as a consequence, 
these countries will lose from integration. The opposite effects, the centrifugal 
forces, cause firms to spread geographically. The centrifugal effects are due to 
matters such as pollution, overcrowding or where agglomeration forces are not 
strong enough (Schiff and Winters, 2003, p 138). 
When firms can supply more customers from fewer locations it is most likely 
that a whole sector, such as the manufacturing sector, might concentrate in one or 
a few locations. If such concentration happens, the areas where firms are less 
efficient will suffer from deindustrialization. Venables states that this is the most 
likely outcome if the manufacturing sector constitutes a small share of an 
economy. Moreover, he notes that deindustrialization is also a plausible outcome 
for developing countries. Furthermore, this type of concentration occurs if sectors 
are not so narrow. On the other hand, as Venables states, knowledge spill-overs 
might only be beneficial for narrowly defined industries (1999, p 16). 
Thus, industries might concentrate in the richest countries which already have 
the most efficient industries. Also, the agglomeration effects are expected to 
concentrate industries in certain regions within countries as well (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003, p 141); however, this will not be addressed here. 
3.1.3 Other Dynamic Effects 
One objective of increasing trade through economic integration is to increase the 
GDP. Schiff and Winters state that there is little evidence that regional agreements 
of LDCs stimulate economic growth. On the other hand, it is more plausible that 
north-south agreements, between developed and least-developed countries will 
increase economic growth; partly due to knowledge spill-overs from developed to 
developing countries as emphasized as one important factor in modern growth 
theories (2003, p 123). Thus, integration of LDCs might decrease the likelihood of 
economic growth compared to the scenario of north-south agreements. For this 
reason, developing countries should have north-south agreements instead of 
south-south agreements. 
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On the other hand, regional agreements may increase FDI. Foreign firms will 
be willing to invest within a community as a result of a larger market. Moreover, 
firms cannot export the same amount to the community once a CET is set up.  FDI 
may also cause technical spill-overs that are beneficial for developing countries. 
Also, a country within a regional agreement which attracts more FDI than other 
countries may grow at a different speed than other members of an agreement, a 
scenario which would cause divergence. 
Baumol states that investments in one country might cause growth in another 
country (1986, p 1078). Basically, due to specialization in different goods, 
investments will have spill-over effects on other countries. Let us assume that 
country A produces motorcycles, and has a comparative advantage in the 
production of motorcycles, while country B has a comparative advantage in the 
production of cotton. In Baumol’s example, an investment in country A of 
motorcycle production would increase the demand for workers. When the demand 
for workers increases, the wage level in that sector also increases. However, the 
increase in wages of country A’s workers could at the same time increase the 
demand for country B’s cotton, leading to higher demand for workers in the 
cotton sector and therefore higher wages in that sector. Increased investment in 
one country of a regional agreement might therefore increase growth in more than 
one country and could lead to convergence. 
3.2 Convergence and Divergence 
When different units approach the level of a certain variable of other units, there is 
convergence. The opposite of convergence is when different units diverge. In this 
paper, only convergence and divergence of GDP per capita will be considered. 
Thus, a case of convergence is when low-income countries catch up with 
relatively high-income countries in terms of GDP per capita. In other words, when 
the dispersion of income per capita between countries decreases there is 
convergence. When the dispersion increases, there is divergence. Also, as Tegoum 
et al. indicate, “perverse” convergence can be detected; that is, countries with 
previously high income per capita may approach the levels of low-income 
countries (2013, p 49). Also, it is plausible that there are groups of countries 
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within a community which converge while other groups diverge; it is thus 
important to consider the growth rates of different countries.  
A general idea why LDCs may converge with more developed countries is 
that less developed countries may take use of technology developed countries 
already have come up with. Technology does not need to be reinvented and 
countries which are less developed may therefore achieve higher growth rates than 
already developed ones, normally called the advantage of backwardness (Todaro 
and Smith, 2011, p 78). Also, Baumol states that the technological progress of one 
country will serve as public goods for other countries (1986, p 1077). In a regional 
agreement where factors of production can move freely, technology is also 
expected to spread among members. 
Another reason that convergence may occur is that in less developed 
countries, capital will experience a higher level of return. The capital-to-labor 
ratio is in general low in LDCs; investments will thus yield high returns to capital 
(Todaro and Smith, 2011, p 78). For this reason it is probable that investors will 
be attracted to LDCs. Again, the investment will cause growth levels to be higher 
in LDCs than in developed countries; consequently, developed and less developed 
countries will converge. However, there is more needed than just high returns to 
capital in order for investments to be made; for instance, well-functioning legal 
systems and infrastructure are required. Still, FDI may be attracted due to a larger 
integrated market. 
However, members might converge after the creation of a CU as well. 
Namely, if the high-income country, in relative terms, has a higher tariff on a 
certain type of commodities than the low-income country before the 
implementation of the CU, the low-income country will gain, given that the low-
income country produces the goods. The low-income country will be the supplier 
of the goods after the CU is implemented and it will gain from integration. The 
higher-income country will lose from integration; thus, countries will converge 
(Schiff and Winters, 2003, p 71). 
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4 Are Countries Diverging? 
It is difficult to predict if members of ECOWAS will converge in the future; 
however, one can speculate about if the trend of divergence which has been found 
is going to continue. How serious divergence is depends on what type of 
divergence there is. If one country lags behind, but the rest are increasing their 
income per capita, it is not as serious as if all of the countries decrease their 
income per capita except for one which increases it. Unfortunately, no previous 
research on effects of comparative advantages and agglomeration forces has been 
found for the case of West Africa. 
In this part, an analysis based on the theories of part three is presented; 
however, firstly, the type and the amount of trade that occur in ECOWAS are 
surveyed. Afterwards, there are two issues that shall be addressed, how the 
comparative advantages might be affected by integration, and if and where 
agglomeration forces are increasing. In order to understand if the members of 
ECOWAS are diverging as a result these effects, the analysis of the dispersion of 
income per capita is presented in part 4.4. Finally, one of the main issues of 
increased integration is the anticipated CET of ECOWAS; therefore, the effects of 
a CET will be discussed as well. 
4.1 Trade 
In general, countries of West Africa do not trade substantially with each other. 
However, as some indicate, one must remember that there is a significant amount 
of informal trade occurring in the region (Masson and Pattillo, 2001, p 2) 
(Aryeetey, 2001, p 10). Thus, all of the trade is not visible in the data. In diagram 
2, one can see that the intra-community trade is around 7.5 percent of total trade 
for all members of ECOWAS while the same figure is around 12 percent for 
WAEMU in 2012. The volume of intra-community trade is small and is 
decreasing for ECOWAS; thus, trade is obviously not increasing in the region due 
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to regional integration. However, there might be numerous other factors affecting 
the trade of members. On the other hand, WAEMU, where members are more 
integrated, has a somewhat higher share and a slightly positive trend of intra-
community trade as share of total trade. Perhaps, ECOWAS might increase its 
share of intra-community trade to the levels of WAEMU when the planned CET is 
put in place. However, it is assumed that the effects or trade diversion and 
agglomeration forces are stronger when countries trade significantly with each 
other. 
 
 
Within ECOWAS, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire are the largest exporters to other 
countries within the community. During the last decade they have accounted for 
about two thirds of the exports within the community. The major importers of the 
community are land-locked Mali, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. However, Ghana’s 
share of total imports within the community is declining while those of Mali and 
Côte d’Ivoire are increasing (WITS, 2014). In diagram 3, the shares of different 
goods of intra-community exports are presented. Manufactures increase as share 
of intra-community exports while agriculture decreases. Even though members of 
ECOWAS are trading less and less with each other, exports of manufactures are 
becoming more important within the community. According to Venables, this 
might be a reason for divergence due to trade diversion, especially if the high-
income countries export manufactures within the community (1999, p 7). 
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In diagram 4, the members which export the largest shares of manufactures are 
presented. The share of Côte d’Ivoire clearly decreases, while that of Ghana 
increases. Ghana should therefore gain more from integration relatively to Côte 
d’Ivoire. However, different types of manufactures are exported by the countries 
but this will not be addressed here. 
 
4.1.1 Why So Little Trade? 
Participants will benefit more from an economic community with a CET and a 
shared currency if they trade substantially with each other. However, there are 
many barriers to trade among the members of ECOWAS. The World Bank report 
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on doing business explains part of why there is so little (formal) intra-regional 
trade in West Africa. Concerning trade across borders, the number of required 
documents, the time it takes to export and import goods and the cost of trade are 
considered in the report. It is important to have in mind that these factors may 
affect the integration process and, particularly, trade data. Additionally, it is 
assumed that difficulties to trade in both the exporting country and the importing 
country impede trade among members of ECOWAS even more. 
Cape Verde, Senegal and The Gambia are the members of ECOWAS where it 
is easiest to trade across borders. On the other hand, Burkina Faso, Niger and Côte 
d’Ivoire are ranked as the members where it is most difficult to trade. The whole 
community is ranked as number 121 in the world. Regarding the time to trade, it 
takes 11 days to export goods and 14 days to import goods in Senegal, for 
instance. However, Senegal’s performance is different from the other members. In 
Niger it takes 59 days to export goods and 64 days to import goods. Also, it is 
most expensive to export goods in Niger (The World Bank, 2012, p 59-66). 
Difficulties to trade might hamper the potentials of economic integration. 
Also, economic growth might be biased towards the countries where it is easier to 
trade. Trade facilitation might be needed in accordance with economic integration 
to spread the benefits to all of the members. A country such as Senegal might 
benefit more from increased integration than a country as Niger. This could be a 
reason for divergence. 
4.2 Comparative Advantages 
The internal
7
 revealed comparative advantages
8
 of manufactures, agriculture and 
petroleum have been calculated for the countries which data are available for in 
1998 and 2010, see table 2. The comparative advantages of agriculture in land-
locked Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have increased significantly from 1998 to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 Values of export flows between members of ECOWAS are used. 
8
 The measure of Revealed Comparative Advantage is used to estimate the relative advantages of different types 
of goods between a set of countries (Balassa 1965, p 107). Here it is calculated as: RCA=(Eig/Eij)/(Eng/Enj) where 
i is country i, n is the set of countries, g is the type of goods g and j is the set of goods. If the value is equal to or 
greater than 1, the country is assumed to have a comparative advantage in that type of goods. 
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2010. Concerning manufactures, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and Togo have 
comparative advantages in both 1998 and 2010 but do not have comparative 
advantages in agriculture in any of the years. It is therefore assumed that these 
countries have stronger comparative advantages in manufactures than countries 
which have comparative advantages in both manufactures and agriculture. 
According to Venables, the countries which have a comparative advantage close 
to the world average will benefit from integration since these countries may 
increase their exports to other members of the community, especially when a CET 
is set up. It is presumed that the countries having a comparative advantage in 
manufactures may benefit most from integration. 
 
Table 2: Internal Revealed Comparative Advantages 
  Agriculture Manufactures Petroleum 
Country 1998 2010 1998 2010 1998 2010 
Benin 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.4     
Burkina Faso 4.2 13.9 0.6 0.6   0.0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.1 0.2 2.0 1.5 0.1   
Cape Verde     2.0 1.4     
Ghana 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Gambia, The 0.4 3.0 1.9 1.2     
Guinea 0.6   1.8       
Mali 5.7 15.6 0.1 0.5 0.0   
Niger 1.9 19.7 0.0 0.2     
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 3.6 3.4 
Senegal 0.0 0.1 2.0 1.4     
Togo 0.0 0.3 2.0 1.4     
   
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (UN COMTRADE). 
Note: Agriculture include group 1, 2 and 5, manufactures include group 15-37 
and petroleum group 11 of the ISIC revision 3.      
 
 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal have relatively high levels of GDP per 
capita; however, Togo has a low level of GDP per capita. It is therefore difficult to 
predict if there will be an overall tendency to convergence or divergence. It is, 
however, important to consider that the value added of manufactures in Togo is 
small compared to the other countries, see section 4.3. Assuming that the 
manufacturing sector is insignificant in Togo one would see divergence of GDP 
per capita between the members of ECOWAS, in line with Venables. 
On the other hand, one must remember that the sector of agriculture might 
generate growth and thus the countries with comparative advantages in this sector 
may benefit more from integration. These countries are the land-locked countries 
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Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2010.
9
 However, as seen in diagram 3, the share 
of agriculture in trade is low and decreasing. 
When one examines the external
10
 comparative advantages, the picture looks 
different, see table 3. Fewer members have comparative advantages in 
manufactures. However, the comparative advantages in agriculture are not as 
strong for most of the countries in 2010 compared to 1998. Ghana is close to have 
a comparative advantage in manufactures in 2010 but does not have it. Mali has a 
comparative advantage in manufactures in 2010; however, within the community 
Mali does not have it, indicating that it is not an exporter of manufactures within 
the community.
11
 Senegal and Togo both have external comparative advantages in 
manufactures in 2010. 
 
Table 3: External Revealed Comparative Advantages 
  Agriculture Manufactures Petroleum 
Country 1998 2010 1998 2010 1998 2010 
Benin 26.9 10.9 0.1 0.8 0.4   
Burkina Faso 24.0 8.5 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 
Côte d'Ivoire 15.3 12.6 0.5 0.6   1.3 
Cape Verde 2.0 0.3 1.0 1.2     
ECOWAS 7.1 2.7 0.3 0.4 14.3 7.2 
Ghana 13.0 5.9 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Gambia, The 24.4 11.3 0.2 0.6     
Guinea 1.1   0.3       
Mali 15.9 2.1 0.5 1.1 0.0   
Niger 9.2 4.3 0.0 0.4   0.0 
Nigeria 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.3 30.0 8.9 
Senegal 2.1 2.4 0.9 1.1   0.0 
Togo 10.4 2.6 0.3 1.0     
   Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (UN COMTRADE). 
Note: Agriculture include group 1, 2 and 5, manufactures include group 15-37 
and petroleum group 11 of the ISIC revision 3.     
 
The whole community also has comparative advantages in agriculture and 
petroleum and a comparative disadvantage in manufactures. Thus, as Venables 
predicts, one can assume that regional integration leads to trade diversion and 
therefore divergence among the members of ECOWAS. The countries which have 
internal comparative advantages in manufactures and not agriculture are assumed 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 The Gambia and Benin also have comparative advantages in agriculture. However, at the same time they have 
comparative advantages in manufactures. 
10
 Values of export flows towards the world are used. 
11
 It is also assumed that the data might be incorrectly collected for Mali since it is not expected to have a 
significant manufacturing sector. 
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to be the winners of integration; these are: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and 
Togo although it is plausible that Togo will not gain equally as the others. 
4.3 Agglomeration Effects 
To know where clusters of industries will grow larger in the future, it is important 
to consider where most of the industries within ECOWAS are situated today and 
have been the last decades. Potentially, agglomeration forces will make industries 
relocate to locations where industries already are present according to Krugman. 
Depending on in which countries these are situated, member states may converge 
or diverge. 
 
Table 4: Value Added of Manufactures in Each Country (% of GDP) 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Benin 7.4 8.1 8.2 7.8 7.7 
Burkina Faso 15.4 15.2 16.3 11.7 7.8 
Cape Verde 9.0 10.1 - - - 
Côte d'Ivoire 20.9 15.0 21.7 19.3 19.1 
Gambia, The 5.5 8.2 6.8 6.6 4.7 
Ghana 9.8 10.3 10.1 9.5 6.8 
Guinea 4.6 4.0 4.0 6.6 7.3 
Guinea-Bissau 8.4 7.9 10.5 - - 
Liberia - 2.7 4.1 7.2 4.0 
Mali 8.5 8.0 3.8 3.2 - 
Niger 6.6 6.4 6.8 - - 
Nigeria - - - 2.8 - 
Senegal 15.3 16.6 14.7 15.2 13.3 
Sierra Leone 4.6 9.3 3.5 2.6 2.3 
Togo 9.9 9.9 8.6 8.5 7.8 
  
Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators.   
 
In table 4, the share of the value added of the manufacturing sector of each 
country is presented. First, the development of the members of WAEMU is 
observed in diagram 5 and 6. In 2010, Côte d’Ivoire had the largest manufacturing 
sector as value added of its GDP compared to the rest of the members, Senegal 
followed thereafter. Both of the members have larger manufacturing sectors than 
the average of WAEMU. The value added of the manufacturing sector increases 
in Côte d’Ivoire but decreases slightly in Senegal. On the other hand, the 
manufacturing sector clearly decreases in Burkina Faso. This could be a sign of 
stronger agglomeration forces in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal than in other 
countries, especially in Côte d’Ivoire. As both Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal have 
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higher levels of GDP per capita, the likelihood of divergence increases, at least 
among the members of WAEMU. However, as seen in section 4.1, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
share of intra-community exports of manufactures decreases. Still, according to 
Krugman’s theory of agglomeration effects, the manufacturing firms of Côte 
d’Ivoire and Senegal are assumed to benefit from internal economies of scale and 
a larger integrated market. The firms in these countries might grow as a CET is 
implemeted (given that this industries are under tariff protection) while 
manufacturing firms of other countries contract. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
could gain most from integration. Again, this indicates that divergence should be 
observed. 
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Among the members with lowest income of WAEMU, Mali and Togo have 
experienced negative trends of the value added of manufacturing as a share of 
their GDP during the considered period. One can assume that the agglomeration 
forces are weaker here compared to other countries. It is also important to note 
that for basically the entire period, the poorest members are below the avarage of 
WAEMU. 
In diagram 7 and 8 the non-WAEMU countries are presented. One can see that 
the value added of manufacturing is in general lower for the non-WAEMU 
members than for the members of WAEMU. It is increasing in Guinea, although 
its share is quite small, but decreasing in Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. Thus, 
the agglomeration forces are most likely to be weaker in the non-members of 
WAEMU. Perhaps, the CET of WAEMU has increased the centripetal forces. 
Moreover, according to Schiff and Winters, Abidjan and Dakar, the capitals of 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, respectively, are examples of cities where industries 
have concentrated (2003, p 142). 
As in the case of the members of WAEMU, one can again see that the poorest 
countries are under the average of the value added of manufacturing of the non-
WAEMU members, the only outlier is Nigeria. This indicates that there is some 
correlation between a high value added of manufacturing and a high level of GDP 
per capita. 
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The share for each member state of the total value added of manufactures of 
ECOWAS is presented in table 5. As is visible, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Senegal make up about 80 percent of the value added of manufactures of 
ECOWAS in 2005
12
; however, remember that Nigeria is considerably larger in 
terms of GDP and population size. In all of these countries, the GDP per capita is 
higher than the average of ECOWAS. However, the value added of manufacturing 
is higher in the countries of WAEMU in general. Again, one can see that there are 
negative trends in Burkina Faso and Mali; also, Niger has experienced a decrease. 
 
Table 5: Share (%) of Value Added, Manufactures, ECOWAS 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Benin 2.9 4.1 4.3 3.4 5.1 
Burkina Faso 9.2 7.9 9.0 5.8 6.7 
Cape Verde 0.6 1.2 - - - 
Côte d'Ivoire 45.5 38.7 50.7 31.8 44.4 
Gambia, The 0.4 1.5 1.2 0.4 0.5 
Ghana 11.6 14.1 10.1 9.4 20.8 
Guinea 2.5 3.3 2.5 1.8 3.2 
Guinea-Bissau 0.4 0.4 0.5 - - 
Liberia - 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Mali 4.0 4.1 1.9 1.6 - 
Niger 3.3 2.8 2.7 - - 
Nigeria - - - 31.7 - 
Senegal 15.8 17.1 13.6 11.5 15.7 
Sierra Leone 0.6 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Togo 3.3 3.0 2.5 1.8 2.5 
Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators.   
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 Data is not available for Nigeria in other years. 
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A larger integrated market and stronger protection from outside competition 
could lead to increased agglomeration forces and an expansion of the 
manufacturing industries in some countries while deindustrialization in other 
countries. The members which have high levels of GDP per capita in general also 
have important manufacturing sectors. This leads to the conclusion that 
divergence is a potential outcome of regional integration in West Africa. 
The data of the value added of manufactures in the member states enforce the 
argument that the members with comparative advantages in manufactures benefit 
more from integration. Namely, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal are found among the 
countries which have comparative advantages in manufactures and among those 
where the manufacturing sector constitutes an important share of the economy. In 
order to see if this has led to divergence, the dispersion of GDP per capita will be 
examined during the same period. 
4.4 Empirical Findings of Divergence 
In order to understand if the internal comparative advantages and the 
agglomeration effects have significant impact on the members’ increase or 
decrease of GDP per capita, the dispersion of GDP per capita between the 
countries has been measured. This is normally denoted as testing for sigma 
convergence. As will be seen below, the effects examined in part 4.2 and 4.3 may 
contribute to divergence. It is also plausible that other factors which have not been 
considered here have affected the divergence between members. However, the 
evidence of sigma divergence makes the analysis above more robust. 
4.4.1 Method 
Analyzing sigma convergence is about examining if the dispersion of a variable 
between a set of units is increasing or decreasing over time. When the dispersion 
is decreasing, there is convergence. In this case, the variable is income per capita 
and the set of units are the member states of ECOWAS. Welsch and Bonn present 
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several measures one can use to test for sigma convergence. In order to test for 
absolute convergence, the standard deviation is appropriate (2007, p 184). 
As Jones indicates, one can measure convergence between countries or among 
individuals of countries. In order to do the latter, and in other words to make the 
individual as the unit of observation, one can weight every member state by its 
number of inhabitants (1997, p 22). 
Often, studies which look for convergence among countries also look for beta 
convergence; this will not be done in this paper. Chassem notes that beta and 
sigma convergence do not oppose each other, rather work as complements (2013, 
p 71). However, according to Tegoum et al., sigma convergence implies beta-
convergence while the opposite is not true (2013, p 49). The purpose of testing for 
sigma convergence in this study is to see in which direction the members of 
ECOWAS are heading and find evidence for what theory predicts. 
4.4.2 Previous Research 
A literature review has been made in order to see if there is evidence of 
convergence or divergence in previous research. A summary of a number of 
studies concerning real sigma convergence (convergence of GDP per capita) of 
states in West Africa is presented in table 6. In general, there seems to be 
convergence among the members of WAEMU while the opposite seems to be true 
when including all of the members of ECOWAS. However, the convergence of 
WAEMU is most likely due to the decrease of GDP per capita of Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Table 6: Previous Research 
Study Period Countries Conclusion 
Hammouda et al. (2009) 1980-2003 ECOWAS Divergence. 
Hammouda et al. (2009) 1980-2003 WAEMU Convergence. 
Chassem (2013) 1970-2005 WAEMU Overall convergence in 1975-2005,  
divergence in 1970-1974. However, 
divergence in 1992-2005 if Côte 
d'Ivoire is excluded.  
Combey, Mally (2013) 1997-2008 WAEMU, except  
Guinea-Bissau. 
Convergence. 
Jones (2002) 1960-1990 ECOWAS,  
including Mauritania. 
Convergence. 
Lamine (2002) - ECOWAS Divergence. 
Lamine (2002) - WAEMU Convergence. However, 
convergence 
to the bottom. 
Tegoum et al. (2013) 1985-2005 ECOWAS, except  
Liberia. 
Divergence. 
Tegoum et al. (2013) 1985-2005 WAEMU Convergence. However, 
convergence is due  
to decrease in GDP per capita of 
Côte d'Ivoire. 
Wetta, Yerbanga (2013) 1980-2008 WAEMU Convergence in 1980-1994  
and in 2000-2008, otherwise  
divergence. 
4.4.3 Divergence of GDP per Capita in ECOWAS 
As one can see in diagram 9, the dispersion of income per capita between all of 
the members of ECOWAS increases and has been increasing during the last 25 
years. Thus, according to these data there is absolute divergence between the 
members of ECOWAS. 1993 has been selected as base year; the standard 
deviation is divided by the standard deviation of 1993. The reason for this is that 
the revised treaty was adopted at this time and it was decided to increase the speed 
of integration. However, the increased speed of integration seems to have 
generated higher inequality in GDP per capita in absolute terms among the 
members. The dispersion is increasing less when constant GDP per capita is used. 
The standard deviation was about 2.5 times larger in 2011 than in 1993 in current 
GDP per capita and 1.75 times larger in constant GDP per capita. 
Thus, absolute divergence is clearly occurring. However, as mentioned in 
section 4.1, the trade volumes between members of, particularly, ECOWAS are 
low. If the intra-regional trade volume would be larger, the consequences of trade 
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diversion and agglomeration forces would plausibly be more significant. In other 
words, if members of ECOWAS would trade more with each other, divergence 
could increase even more. 
 
 
One of the reasons why this increased dispersion is observed is that the GDP 
per capita of Cape Verde has increased significantly over the whole period 
compared to the other members. All of the other countries but three had positive 
growth rates. Except for Cape Verde, Ghana and Nigeria had the highest growth 
rates as one can see in diagram 10. Ghana’s increase is not unexpected since it has 
an internal comparative advantage in manufactures; however, its GDP per capita 
might grow even more when the CET of ECOWAS is implemented. Nigeria’s 
growth is most likely due to its comparative advantage in petroleum. 
 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
S
D
t/
S
D
9
3
 
Year 
Diagram 9: Dispersion of GDP/capita, Not Weighted 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Note: Values are in constant and current  PPP international $ (constant 2005). 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
G
D
P
/c
a
p
it
a
 
Year 
Diagram 10: Highest Growth 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Note: Values are in constant PPP 2005 International $. 
Current 
Constant 
Cape Verde 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
 35 
 
 
The countries which have negative trends in constant GDP per capita are, most 
importantly, Côte d’Ivoire but also Guinea Bissau. Niger had basically a constant 
level of constant GDP per capita during the period, see diagram 11. It is 
unexpected that Côte d’Ivoire has experienced a negative trend of GDP per capita; 
this weakens the arguments made above. However, it might be due to the low 
trade volumes between countries. 
 
 
Another reason that Côte d’Ivoire has experienced a negative trend over the 
last decades while its manufacturing sector has, at the same time, experienced a 
slight increase as share of the value added of GDP is that there are other countries 
which have comparative advantages in manufactures. Senegal, for instance, has an 
external comparative advantage in manufactures in 2010 while Côte d’Ivoire is far 
from having it in the same year. Simply, Senegal might have gained more from 
integration than Côte d’Ivoire since it has a stronger comparative advantage in 
manufactures. Moreover, as seen in section 4.1, Côte d’Ivoire’s share of intra-
regional exports of manufactures decreases, indicating that other members’ 
manufactures are attractive. However, it is believed that if trade volumes would be 
higher within the community, the exporters of manufactures would gain more, 
leading to increased divergence. 
In diagram 12, population size is taken into consideration and again the trend 
of increasing dispersion of GDP per capita is clearly visible. Thus, member states 
which have a relatively high number of inhabitants are given more weight, notably 
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Nigeria. Cape Verde, on the other hand, is given very little weight since its 
population size is insignificant in comparison. This leads to results that are not as 
dramatic as when the standard deviation is not weighted by population size. Still, 
the dispersion increased by 2.25 and 1.5 times of current and constant GDP per 
capita respectively from 1993 to 2011. So, until today, one can draw the 
conclusion that the absolute difference of GDP per capita among the members of 
ECOWAS has increased. 
 
4.5 The CET 
One final point to consider is the planned CET and if it may cause the members of 
ECOWAS to converge or diverge in the future. It is important to know which 
country produces which goods. Also, it is important to know the tariff level of 
different goods, specifically of those that will fall under the fifth band of 35 
percent. As already mentioned, the goods that will be in the fifth band of the CET 
are, so called, specific goods for economic development. In order to be classified 
in the 35 percent tariff band, goods must fulfill the following criteria of eligibility: 
product vulnerability, economic diversification, integration, sector promotion and 
high potential for production (ECOWAS Aid for Trade). The tariff levels are 
presented in table 7 along with the number of products that are going to be 
included in each tariff band. 
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Table 7: The CET of ECOWAS 
Type of Products  Tariff Rate (%) Product Lines 
Specific goods that contribute to the 
promotion of the region’s  
economic development. 
35 130 
Final consumer products. 20 2165 
Intermediate products. 10 1373 
Basic raw materials and  
capital goods. 
5 2146 
Other. 0 85 
Source: ECOWAS 2013a. 
 
Depending on which goods receive 35 percent tariff protection, the effects on 
the member states of ECOWAS will be different. However, trade diversion is 
most likely a possible consequence and might cause even more divergence 
between countries than observed in section 4.4. Member states which have 
producers of goods that are under 35 percent tariff protection might enjoy faster 
growth while the countries which do not have such industries might not grow as 
fast. The obvious questions are which goods that will be included in the fifth tariff 
band and which countries that produce these goods. 
Unfortunately, a list of tariff levels for different goods was not available at the 
time this paper was written. However, Nigeria has implemented a five band tariff 
schedule similar to the one that is planned for ECOWAS where 164 of the product 
lines apply to the 35 percent tariff band out of 5685 tariff lines in total. Since 
Nigeria demanded the fifth band and has a similar tariff structure, its 35 percent 
tariff band that it currently uses will be examined. 
Each country’s share of total imports of the goods that Nigeria has put in the 
35 percent tariff band is presented in table 8.
13
 In 2010, 11.4 percent of Benin’s 
total imports are of goods that Nigeria has put in the 35 percent band; however, 
Benin does not necessarily import these goods from Nigeria. Togo’s rate is also 
high, 10.9 percent of its imports are included in Nigeria’s band of 35 percent. One 
can also see that of Togo’s imports only 1.1 percent came from Nigeria when 
petroleum and petroleum products are excluded. These shares should be 
considered significant since they concern 164 out of 5685 tariff lines. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13
 Only 115 of the 164 product lines could be included since the tariff schedule of Nigeria is disaggregated to 10 
digits, data only provided disaggregation to six digits. 
 38 
 
Table 8: Nigeria’s Current Tariff, 2010 
  
Share (%) of imports of 
goods  
that are included in 
Nigeria's 35 percent 
tariff band. 
Share (%) of imports 
from 
Nigeria of total imports, 
except petroleum and 
petroleum products. 
Share (%) of Nigeria's 
exports to country of 
intra-community trade. 
Benin 11.4   3.7 
Togo 10.9 1.1 0.11 
Burkina Faso 7.1 1.3 2.5 
Gambia, The 6.8 0.1 0.1 
Niger 5.8 2.8 1.62 
Ghana 5.4 0.4 21.6 
Senegal 4.9 0.9 9.4 
Cape Verde 4.6 0.0 0.0 
Mali 3.5 0.2 0.1 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.1 10.3 62.1 
Nigeria 0.8     
  
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (UN COMTRADE) and Nigeria Customs Service (2014). 
  
  
1: Data from 2009 
2: Data from 2008 
 
  
 
This scenario would most likely lead to divergence if the CET is implemented 
and would look similar to the tariff structure Nigeria has in place today. Togo has 
a low level of GDP per capita while Nigeria is one of the members of ECOWAS 
that has the highest level of GDP per capita. Trade diversion would occur since 
members of ECOWAS would import inefficiently produced commodities from 
Nigeria. As a consequence, Nigeria is assumed to grow faster than Togo.
14
 Still, 
one cannot say that the CET of ECOWAS will look like the one of Nigeria; 
however, it might become similar to it. Thus, this is highly speculative. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14
 Other members may also benefit from the CET. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, regional integration of West Africa has been discussed. 15 countries 
which are members of two different regional integration agreements, ECOWAS 
and WAEMU, have been included in the study. The research problem was to 
investigate if regional economic integration makes, or has made, members to 
diverge economically. In order to study this, comparative advantages of members 
and agglomeration forces within the community have been considered. Also, an 
analysis of sigma convergence has been made. The results points towards 
divergence among the members of ECOWAS, both when examining the issue 
theoretically and when testing for sigma convergence.  
The members which export manufactures and have relatively high GDP per 
capita levels are assumed to benefit more from integration than the members with 
lower levels of GDP per capita; however, Côte d’Ivoire seems to be an exception. 
The decreasing trend of GDP per capita of Côte d’Ivoire weakens Venables’ 
theory that exporters of manufactures will gain most from integration. However, 
effects of trade diversion and agglomeration forces would most likely have been 
more significant if trade volumes between members would have been larger. 
It is important to remember that the issue of convergence and divergence is 
not straightforward. Sometimes countries converge to the bottom, which seems to 
be the case of WAEMU and sometimes there are one or a few countries which 
have higher growth rates than other countries. The latter seems to be present in 
ECOWAS. The GDP per capita level of Cape Verde has grown faster than for 
most of the other countries. Nevertheless, even when controlling for population 
size, there is evidence of sigma divergence among the members of ECOWAS. 
Moreover, convergence and divergence between countries tell us nothing 
about how the situation is within the borders of different countries. Most likely, 
there are small regions, or cities, which benefit more from economic integration 
than for instance rural parts of countries. One can see that some countries attract 
more of the manufacturing industries. According to theory, these industries are 
almost certainly concentrated in industrial clusters. These agglomeration effects 
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are central to convergence and divergence of GDP per capita between countries 
but also between regions. It is obvious that the manufacturing sector has decreased 
in Burkina Faso and Mali while it has experienced a slight increase in Côte 
d’Ivoire; the agglomeration forces might therefore be stronger in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The manufacturing sector in Côte d’Ivoire is plausibly highly concentrated in a 
few regions within the country. This is something which future research should 
address since it is crucial to know if redistribution policies shall be used. 
Another issue to come back to concerns the CET of ECOWAS and the goods 
that will be included in the fifth band. It is important to understand which 
countries that have internal comparative advantages in these commodities since 
they are assumed to be the winners of integration according to theory. 
Unfortunately, this could not be examined thoroughly in this paper.  
Also, the comparative advantages in this thesis are calculated at an aggregated 
level. If one would study the comparative advantages of different countries in 
ECOWAS at a more disaggregated level the picture could be different. It is 
important to understand which specific manufacturing industries that benefit most. 
Another question which this paper did not address is why divergence between 
members of regional integration agreements is undesirable. The short answer is 
that it is unfair to the individuals that live in countries which lose from 
integration. Also, regional powers may gain more influence in other sectors due to 
increased economic power. However, at the same time, the total number of people 
that benefit from integration might be higher if Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 
are winners of integration since there is a significant share of the total population 
of ECOWAS living in these countries. 
As already mentioned, divergence is not a straightforward issue; however, 
since the gains from trade are said to benefit all, regional integration should 
likewise benefit all participants. If this is not the case, an intervention of 
ECOWAS might be necessary to redistribute the gains to all of the member states 
and their citizens. 
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